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TN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
BUSINESS CASE DTVJS10N
STA TE OF GEORGIA

GUSH. SMALL, as and only as
Administrative Trustee of the Trust for
Richard Charles Bunzl and His Lineal
Descendants, The Trust for Suzanne Irene
Bunzl and Her Lineal Descendants, and The
Trust for the Lineal Descendants of Walter
Henry Bunzl; BUNZL TRUSTS
INVESTMENTS, LLC ilk/a Coronado
Investments, LLC; and BUNZL TRUST
PROPERTIES, LLC f/k/a Capital Piedmont
Partners, LLC,

ClYIL ACTION NO.
20 l 6CY280892

Bus. Case Div. 4

Plaintiffs.
V.

WILLIAM C. LANKFORD, JR. and
MOORE STEPHENS, TILLER, LLC,
Defendants.

ORDER ON DEFENDANT LANKF ORD'S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY
AND PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

The above styled action is before the Court on Defendant William C. Lankford's Motion
to Compel Discovery and Plaintiffs' Motion for Protective Order. In his Motion to Compel
Discovery, Defendant Lankford asks the Court to compel Plaintiffs to produce various
documents from the current Administrative Trustee's (Gus I-I. Small) files. Plaintiffs, in turn,
request that the Court issue a protective order under O.C.G.A. §9-ll-26(c).
Mr. Small is the Administrative Trustee of tlu·ee separate trusts at issue in this litigation
which were established for the benefit of the descendants of Walter Henry Bunzl (the "Bunzl

Trusts"). Mr. Small was appointed and approved Administrative Trustee of the Bunzl Trusts on
June 23, 2015 while this litigation was ongoing. He is also an attorney and claims to bave
provided legal services to the beneficiaries. Mr. Small and two limited liability companies
("LLCs") which are primarily owned by the Bunzl Trusts have brought this action against
Defendants Lankford and Moore-Stephens & Tiller, LLC, an accounting film where Mr.
Lankford was a member. Plaintiffs allege Defendants breached their duties when performin g
accounting services for the Bunzl Trusts and the LLCs. Plaintiffs assert claims for professional
negligence/malpractice, an accounting, attorneys' fees and expenses, and punitive damages.
In the instant motion, Defendant Lankford asserts Plaintiffs have refused to respond to
requests for the production of certain categories of documents from Mr. Small's trustee files
which Defendant argues are relevant to Plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs argue the requested
documents and information relating to the administration of the Bunzl Trusts during Mr. Small's
tenure as trustee or not relevant, the requests are overly broad, and the documents and
information are protected from disclosw·e under the attorney client privilege and the "common
interest" doctrine.
I.

Applicable standards

With respect to the general scope of discovery, O.C.G.A. §9-ll-26(b)(l) provides:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in
the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of

the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other
party, including the existence, description, nature, custody,
condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible
things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge
of any discoverable matter. lt is not ground for objection that the
information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the
information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence ...
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(Emphasis added). See also Bowden v. The Med. Ctr .. Inc., 297 Ga. 285, 291, 773 S.E.2d 692,
696 (2015) ("[l]n the discovery context, courts should and ordinarily do interpret 'relevant' very
broadly to mean any matter that is relevant to anything that is or may become an issue in
litigation") (quoting Oppenheimer Fund. Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978)) (internal
quotations omitted).
O.C.G.A. §9-11-26(c) generally governs the entry of protective orders and authorizes
courts to "make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense." O.C.G.A. §9-11-26(c). "The issuance
of a protective order is a recognition of the fact that in some circumstances the interest in
gathering information must yield to the interest in protecting a party." Bd. of Regents of Univ.
Sys. of Georgia v. Ambati, 299 Ga. App. 804, 811, 685 S.E.2d 719, 726 (2009) (citation
omitted). Nevertheless, protective orders should not be used as a means to hinder legitimate
discovery and the burden is on the movant to show "good cause" for its entry. O.C.G.A. §9-ll26(c). As summarized by the Court of Appeals of Georgia in Caldwell v. Church, 341 Ga. App.
852,802 S.E.2d 835 (2017):
"O.C.G.A. § 9-l l-26(c) does establish a general statutory basis for the
entry of protective orders limiting or curtailing discovery under
appropriate circumstances, provided such Limitations do not have the
effect of frustrating and preventing legitimate discovery." Christopher v.
State of Ga., 185 Ga. App. 532,533,364 S.E.2d 905 (1988) (citation and
punctuation omitted). Such protective orders, which are within the
discretion of the trial judge, "are intended to be protective-not
prohibitive-and, until such time as the court is satisfied by substantial
evidence that bad faith or harassment motivates the discoveror's [sic]

action, the court should not intervene to limit or prohibit the scope of
pretrial discovery." Bullard v. Ewing, 158 Ga. App. 287,291,279 S.E.2d
737 (1981)
Caldwell, 341 Ga. App. at 861 (emphasis added).
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With respect to

the attorney-client privilege, O.C.G.A. §24-5-501 (a)(2) "exclude]s] from

evidence on grounds of public policy ... [ c ]ommunications between attorney and client."
Importantly, "[t]he statutes setting out attorney-client privilege are not...broadly construed" but
rather the privilege is "confined ... to "its narrowest permissible limits under the statue of its
creation." Tenet Healthcare Corp. v. Louisiana Forum Corp., 273 Ga. 206. 208, 538 S.E.2d 441,
444 (2000) (citing Atlantic Coast Line .R. Co. v. Daugherty. I I I Ga. App. 144(1), 141 S.E.2d
112 (1965)). indeed, "[ijnasmuch as the exercise of the privilege results in the exclusion of
evidence, a narrow construction of the privilege comports with the view that the ascertaimnent of
as many facts as possible leads to the truth, the discovery of which is the object of all legal
investigation." Tenet Healthcare Corp., 273 Ga. at 208 (citations and punctuation omitted).
Thus, only communications between counsel and the client are protected and the
privilege "extends only to confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating the
rendition of legal services to the client." Southern Guar. Ins. Co. of Georgia v. Ash, 192 Ga.
App. 24, 28, 383 S.E.2d 579, 583 (1989). A communication is not privileged simply because it
is made by or to a person who happens to be a lawyer. See Diversified Indus .. Inc. v. Meredith,
572 F.2d 596: 602 (8th Cir. 1977). Further, the burden is on the party asserting the privilege "to
prove that his communications to counsel were privileged and thus not subject to discovery."
Peterson v. Baumwell, 202 Ga. App. 283, 285, 414 S.E.2d 278, 280 (1991 ). See also Georgia
Cash Am .. lnc. v. Strong, 286 Ga. App. 405, 413, 649 S.E.2d 548, 555 (2007) ("[A party's]
suggestion that the fact that an attorney might have reviewed or commented upon a document
automatically protects the document under the attorney-client privilege is unsupported by any
authority and, in fact, conflicts with prior opinions by this Court").
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Georgia courts have also recognized the "common interest" privilege or doctrine. lt
"allows attorneys representing different clients with similar legal interests to share information
without having to disclose it to others." In re Teleglobe Commc'ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 364 (3d
Cir. 2007), as amended (Oct. 12 2007). See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers

§ 76 (2000) ("If two or more clients with a common interest in a litigated or nonlitigated matter
are represented by separate lawyers and they agree to exchange information concerning the
matter, a communication of any such client that otherwise qualifies as privileged under§§ 68-72
that relates to the matter is privileged as against third persons. Any such client may invoke the
privilege, unless it has been waived by the cJient who made the communication").
As used by Georgia courts, U1e common interest doctrine applies where:
(I) the communication is made by separate parties in U1e course of a
matter of common interest; (2) the communication is designed to further
that effort; and (3) the privilege has not been waived. The privilege does
not require a complete unity of interests among the participants, and it
may apply where the parties' interests are adverse in substantial respects.
McKesson Corp. v. Green, 266 Ga. App. 157, 161 n.8, 597 S.E.2d 447, 452 (2004), affd. 279
Ga. 95, 610 S.E.2d 54 (2005) (citing United States v. Benwnzi, 216 F.R.D. 487, 495 (N.D. Cal.
2003)). Under the doctrine, "[a] transfer of documents to a party with 'strong common
interests' in sharing the work product, or a transfer made with a guarantee of confidentiality,
does not waive the [privilege]." McKesson Corp .. 266 Ga. App. at 161. However, the common
interest doctrine only applies with respect to communications or documents that are otherwise
privileged. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 76, supra; Holland v.
Island Creek Corp., 885 F. Supp. 4, 6 (D.D.C. 1995) ("Under the common interest rule,
individuals may share information without waiving the attorney-client privilege ... ")
(emphasis added).
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TI.

Disputed Discovery Requests
The following discovery requests from Defendants' First Request for Production of

Documents ("RPD") are at issue in the instant motion:
RPD No. 1: Please produce all Documents relating to services provided by
Gus H. Small to the Bunzls, the Bunzl Trusts, and/or the Bunzl Entities.
RPO No. 2: Please produce all bills, invoices, fee schedules, and/or other
Documents relating to fees paid or incurred relating to services Gus. H.
Small provided to the Bunzls, the Bunzl Trusts and/or the Bunzl Entities.
RPD No. 3: Please produce all receipts, payments, and/or other
Documents relating to any costs incurred or paid by Gus H. Small for
which he was reimbursed by the Bunzls, the Bunzl Trusts, and the Bunzl
Entities.
RPD No. 4: Please produce all Communications between Gus H. Small
and the Bunzls relating to services provided to the Bunzls, the Bunzl
Trusts, and/or the Bunzl Entities.
RPD No. 5: Please produce all demands, requests, reports, evaluations,
Communications, and/or other Documents sent to or from Gus H. Small
relating to the Bunzl Trusts and/or the Bunzl Entities, including their
management, records, or administration.
RPD No. 6: Please produce all Documents and Communications sent to or
from Gus H. Small relating to any transaction affecting the Bunzl Trusts
and/or the Bunzl Entities.
RPD No. 7: Please produce all profit and loss statements, balance sheets,
tax returns, and any other Document relating to the finances of the Bunzl
Trusts and/or the Bunzl Entities that have come into existence since Gus.
H. Small has served as Administrative Trustee.
RPD No. 8: Please produce all inventories, accountings, and appraisals
relating to the BunzLLI [sic] Trusts and/or the Bunzl Entities that have come
into existence since Gus H. Small served as Administrative Trustee.
RPD No. 9: Please produce all reports, analyses memoranda, and
summaries prepared by or for Gus H. Small relating to the Bunzls, the
Bunzl Trusts, and/or the Bunzl Entities that have come into existence since
Gus H. Small has served as Administrative Trustee.
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III.

Analysis and Conclusions of Law
Applying the authorities summarized above, the Court generally finds that the requested

documents related to the administration of the Bunzl Trusts during Mr. Small's tenure as
Administrative Trustee are relevant, particularly in light of Mr. Small's investigation in his
capacity as trustee of the status and assets of the Bunzls Trust as well as Plaintiffs' broad claims
for damages.
To the extent Plaintiffs assert any of the requested documents are protected from
disclosure under the attorney-client privilege, they have not identified any particular documents
they contend are covered under the privilege nor have they provided a privilege log. Moreover,
Plaintiffs cannot broadly assert attorney-client privilege to protect documents from disclosure
merely because Mr. Small not only acts as the Administrative Trustee but also serves the Bunzl
Trusts and/or the Bunzls in some undefined, ad hoc legal capacity. Only communications by a
client seeking legal advice fall under the privilege. As noted by the Court of Appeals of Georgia
in Southern Guar. Ins. Co. of Georgia:

It further is required that the attorney's advice must primarily concern
legal advice rendered "in the line of his profession." See [Taylor v. Taylor,
179 Ga. 691, 693, 177 S.E. 582, 583 (1934); Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling
Co. v. Goss, 50 Ga. AJ)p. 637, 179 S.E. 420, 421 (1935); Diversified
Indus .. Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 6 I 6 (8th Cir. 1977)]. "The
privilege does not simply follow an attorney by virtue of his
profession." Agnor, supra at 52. Moreover, "[tjhe attorney-client privilege
extends only to confidential communications made for the purpose of
facilitating the rendition of legal services to the client. [Cit.] Thus, where
the attorney acts merely ... as a business adviser f cit. I the privilege is
inapplicable." United States v. Horvath, 73 l F.2d 557, 561 (USCA 8th
Cir.) "[Tjhe privilege would never be available to allow a corporation to
funnel its papers and documents into the hands of its lawyers for custodial
purposes and thereby avoid disclosure .... [I]t seems well settled that the
requisite professional relationship is not established when the client
seeks business or personal advice, as opposed to legal assistance."
(Emphasis supplied.) Radiant Burners v. American Gas Assn .. 320 F.2d
314. 324 (U.S.C.A. 7th Cir.), cert. den. 375 U.S. 929, 84 S.Ct. 330, 11
7

L.Ed.2d 262; see In the Matter of Walsh. 623 F.2d 489,494 (U.S.C.A. 7th
Cir.), cert. den. 449 U.S. 994, 101 S.Ct. 531, 66 L.Ed.2d 291 (business and
other advice not privileged should be distinguished from professional legal
services); see also [Marriott Corp. v. Am. Acad. of Psychotherapists, Inc.,
157 Ga. App. 497, 502(3)(a), 277 S.E.2d 785, 789 (1981)]; see
generally 98 ALR2d 241, § 5; 97 C.J.S., Witnesses§ 280.8910.
Southern Guar. Ins. Co. of Georgia, 192 Ga. App. at 28 (emphasis added).
The same rationale applies for an attorney-trustee administering a trust and rendering
non-legal as well as legal advice. insofar as the burden rests with Plaintiffs to establish that the
privilege applies, the Court finds Plaintiffs have not met that burden. Further, to the extent
Plaintiffs assert "[a] common interest privilege against disclosure should be applied to
communications between the Trustees for the Bunzl Trustees in this case,"' that doctrine does
not create a privilege. Rather it is intended to allow for the sharing of otherwise privileged
information among individuals with a common interest in a legal dispute without waiving the
privilege. Insofar as no showing has been made that any particular documents are privileged, it
does not appear that the doctrine has application.
Given the above, Defendant Lankford's Motion to Compel is GRANTED with respect to
RPD Nos. 2, 3, 7, and 8. The motion is also granted with respect to RPD No. 5 but the Court
narrows that request to the production of "demands, requests, reports, [and] evaluations" sent to
or from Gus H. Smal I in his capacity as Administrative Trustee relating to the management,

records, or administration of the Bunzl Trusts and/or the Bunzl Entities. Similarly, the Motion to
Compel is granted with respect to RPD No. 9 but the Court narrows that request to the
production of "all reports, analyses, memoranda, and summaries" prepared by or for Mr. Small
in his capacity as Administrative Trustee relating to the Bunzls, tbe Bw12l Trusts, and/or the
Bunzl Entities that have come into existence since Mr. Small has served as Administrative
Plaintiffs· Response in Opposition to Defendant William C. Lankford's Motion
Motion for Protective Order, p. 16.
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Compel Discovery and

Trustee. Plaintiffs are ORD ERE D to supplement their production as to the foregoing discovery
requests within thirty (30) days of this order.

However. the Court finds RPD No. 1 (seeking "all Documents relating to services
provided by (Mr. Small]"), RPD No. 4 (seeking "all Communications between [Mr. Small] and
the Bunzls relating to services provided"), and RPD No. 6 (seeking "all Documents and
Communications sent to or from [Mr. Small] relating to any transactions affecting the Bunzl
Trusts and/or the Bunzl Entities") are overly broad and not appropriately tailored to the claims
and defenses at issue in this litigation. Defendants' Motion to Compel is DENIED with respect to
the foregoing requests.

In light of the Court's rulings herein, Plaintiffs' Motion for a Protective Order 1s
DENIED.

/
SO ORDERED this _j_ day of March, 2019.

·ulton County 'uperior Court
Business Case Division
Atlanta Judicial Circuit
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Attorneys for Defe.µdants

Counsel for William C. Lankford:
David J. Larson
Ross D. Ginsberg
Amber E. Tuggle

F. Edwin Hallman, Jr.
Richard A. Wingate
HALLMAN & WTNGA TE LLC
166 Anderson Street, S.E., Suite 210
Marietta GA 30060

WEINBERG, WHEELER, HUDGINS,
GUNN & DIAL, LLC
3344 Peachtree Road, N.E., Suite 2400
Atlanta, Georgia 30326
Tel: (404) 876-2700
cllarson(@.wwhgd.com
rginsberg(w,v,rwhgcl.com
atuggle@wv.rhgd.com

ehallman@.ballmanwingate.com
rwingate@.hallmanwingate.com

Anthony C. Lake
Craig A. Gillen

GILLEN WITHERS & LAKE, LLC
400 Galleria Parkway, Suite 1920
Atlanta, GA 30339
aclake(@,gwllawfirm.com
cgillen@gwllav.rfirm.com

Counsel for Moore Stephens Tiller, LLC
Johannes S. Kingma
Shannon M. Sprinkle
CARLOCK COPELAND & STAIR
191 Peachtree Street, NE, Suite 3600
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Tel: 404-522-8220

jkingn1a@carlockcopeland.com
ss12rinkle@carlockcogeland.com
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